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Abstract. In this work we present an approach to emotional reasoning
for believable agents, by introducing a mechanism to progressively build
a map of knowledge for reasoning. We present the notion of inference
graph for progressive reasoning in an emotional context. In this model,
knowledge is partially highlighted and noticed by the agent.
1 Introduction
A believable character is a synthetic actor in a virtual environment that is able to
provide an illusion of life [10]. This kind of agents are interesting in entertainment
(Mainly role-playing games) [6, 2] and tutoring applications [1], where there is
a strong connection and interaction with the human user for long periods of
time. Many aspects of believable characters are being studied, such as graphical
aspects, user interaction and behaviour modelling.
One of the properties rarely addressed in this scenario is the connection be-
tween emotions and reasoning. In this area, we are particularly interested in how
emotions can conduct and affect the process of reasoning towards a believable
behaviour [7]. In most KR&R models, decision and reasoning processes are done
by contrasting, according to different mechanisms, all the information that an
agent possesses, regarding the size of the knowledge base. This is mandatory
in many domains, but is not a natural behaviour in believable agents. In fact,
humans do not take all of its knowledge into account to make a decision, or to
become credulous or not about some claim. In a real-time fashion, the human
way of thinking uses only information that is relevant or highlighted in a partic-
ular moment. As knowledge is used in a thinking process, additional information
may get highlighted and new mental elaborations are possible. For instance, peo-
ple usually remember some anecdotes just when seeing a photo of an old friend.
This process of retrieving internal knowledge may be conducted by emotions. A
person enjoying in a party is not likely to remember sad things. A flight passen-
ger feeling fear may not remember crew instructions during an emergency, while
other passengers may only think about protecting their cellphone first. Different
emotional states lead to different reasoning and then to different reactions.
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We are interesting in the modelling of reasoning mechanisms that include
emotions as relevant conductors. In this work we present an approach to emo-
tional reasoning for believable agents, by introducing a mechanism to progres-
sively build a map of defeasible knowledge for reasoning. Since emotions may
affect reasoning and reasoning may affect emotions, the highlighted knowledge
evolves trough time. In this approach, a logic program is used to represent the
knowledge of the agent, and the reasoning of the agent is presented as the evolu-
tion of an inference graph similar to those used in various works in TMS [4], and
argumentation [8, 11, 9]. This work is based on the formalism presented in [3], but
instead of using abstract arguments as information pieces, we add more detail by
the specification of the agent’s knowledge as a set of inference rules, what allows
us to model the reasoning process more closely to a incoming implementation.
We have organized the paper as follows: Section 2 introduce the notion of
an agent whose reasoning is influenced by emotions. The components of the
model as well as the basic principles and interactions are explained. In Section
3 a cycle of the reasoning process of the agent is described, showing how the
reasoning model evolves due to the consideration of new information. Section 4
is a discussion about some ideas to make the model more dynamic through the
continuous evolution of emotions during the process.
2 An Emotional Reasoning Agent
Our Emotional Reasoning Agent is equipped with a set of emotions engaging
a process of reasoning in a virtual environment. These emotions influence over
the selection of rules in such a process, since the knowledge of the agent can
be partially highlighted according to the current emotional profile. In this work
emotions and arguments are treated abstractly, since we are interested in the
general model of reasoning for an actor in a virtual scenario.
Emotional factors are denoted as positive literals in the form x(p1, . . . , pn),
where x is usually the name of the emotion (such as love or hate) and pi are
literals. The set of all the emotional factors is denoted as E. For instance, the set
E = {fear(fire), fear(pet dies), courage()} is a set of emotions. The intensity
of an emotion is denoted by the function ev : E→ Z+∪{0}. An emotional state,
denoted as ξ, is a set of emotional factors with intensity. For instance, the pair
〈E, ev〉, with ev(fear(fire)) = 5, ev(fear(pet dies)) = 20, ev(courage()) = 1 is
a valid emotional state.
We use Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) [5] to model the knowledge
of an agent, as a tuple P = (∆,Σ), where ∆ is a set of defeasible DeLP rules
and Σ is a set of presumptions. For instance, the following is a valid knowledge
base of an emotional agent:
– ∆ = {fuego(Y )−≺fuego(X), next(X,Y ); dies(X)−≺in(X,Y ), fuego(Y );
∼dies(X)−≺in(X,Y ), fuego(Y ), escapes(X)}
– Σ = {fuego(cocina)−≺; next(cocina, living)−≺; in(living, tom)−≺;
escapes(tom)−≺}
15th Argentine Symposium on Articial Intelligence, ASAI 2014
43 JAIIO - ASAI 2014 - ISSN: 1850-2784 - Página 52
2.1 Emotional reasoning
As stated before, we are interested in a model of reasoning influenced by emo-
tional factors for an actor in a virtual, dynamic environment towards a believable
behaviour. An agent of this kind does not use his knowledge base as a whole,
but only a highlighted part of it, according to its own emotional state. Thus,
in our model it is possible that an inference rule is not noticed by the agent in
a particular moment and then some conclusions may not be reached. Different
emotional states may have different results over the state of awareness of the
inner knowledge. Knowledge awareness is then subject to the emotional state
of the agent. Given a program (P ) and a set of valued emotional factors ξ, we
define a function S : P× ξ → R such that, for each rule r ∈ P, S(r, ξ) represents
the intensity of the rule r according the emotional state ξ.
For simplicity, we will define an intensity requirement for a rule r, represent-
ing the intensity that r needs to reach in any emotional state in order to be
highlighted. A rule with intensity below this threshold will not be noticed by the
emotional agent. Under this binary interpretation, the higher this requirement
is, the more difficult is to fulfil the conditions to use the rule.
Definition 1. (Intensity Requirement) Let r be a rule in P. The intensity re-
quirement of r, is denoted as a function µ : P → Z. If S(r, ξ) ≥ µ(r) then the
rule is said to be highlighted, otherwise it is said to be concealed.
Fig. 1: Emotional intensity of rules
For illustrative purposes, the intensity of rules can be graphically described
as in Figure 1, where the circle represents a rule, the doted line in the circle
is the intensity requirement, and the filled part of the circle is the intensity
level. In Figure 2 a knowledge base is shown. Rules with intensity level above
the intensity requirement are highlighted rules, painted in dark grey. Concealed
rules are painted in light grey.
Fig. 2: A graphic representation for the awareness of program rules
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2.2 Inference Graph
Similar to the structures used in truth maintenance systems [4], the mental ac-
tivity of the agent is represented using an inference graph, which evolves through
the time as new inference rules are used and then new conclusions are obtained.
This evolution is modelled in [3] using abstract arguments. An inference graph
is composed by two types of nodes: the inference rule nodes, and the conclusion
nodes. Inference rule nodes represent defeasible rules or presumptions from a
subjacent program P, while conclusion nodes represent literals of the language.
Literals are not replicated in the graph, in such a way that every reference of it
by an inference rule (either as a conclusion or as a premise) remit to the same
conclusion node. This shared use of premises by part of different inferences (or
arguments, in an argumentative view) has been called as a divergent argument
structure by D. Walton [12].
Definition 2. (Inference Graph) An inference graph G is a tuple (CN, IN, SR,
NR,AR), where CN is a set of conclusion nodes, IN is a set of inference rule
nodes, SR ∈ IN ×CN is a set of support relations, NR ∈ CN × IN is a set of
necessity relations, and AR ∈ CN × CN is a set of attack relations.
Nodes, either inference or conclusion ones, will be denoted with brackets. If
x is an element of P or a conclusion literal, then [x] is the corresponding node.
The support relation links inference nodes to the conclusion node contain-
ing the head of its rule. The rule is understood as a reason to believe in the
conclusion. For instance, there is a support relation between the inference node
[c−≺a, b] and the conclusion node [c]. The necessity relation links conclusion
nodes with inference nodes to whose rule it is a premise, and it reflects the fact
that the former is needed to apply the inference step defined by the latter. For
instance, there is a necessity relation between the conclusion node [b] and the
inference node [c−≺a, b]. The attack relation exists between every pair of con-
clusion nodes containing complementary literals. For instance, there is an attack
relation between the conclusion nodes [q] and [¬q].
There are two types of marking for a node: support markings and acceptance
markings. The support markings are supported and unsupported. The ac-
ceptance marking are accepted,rejected and undecided. A conclusion node
has support and acceptance markings, while an inference node has only accep-
tance markings. If [c] is a node, then [c]s is the corresponding support marking
and [c]a is the acceptance marking of [c].
A conclusion node [c] is marked as [c]s =supported if there is at least one
inference node [r] such that [r]a =accepted, and (r, c) ∈ SR. A conclusion
node [c] is marked as [c]a =accepted if [c]s =supported, and either it is
preferred (according to some preference criteria) over the conclusion node [¬c],
or the confronting node [¬c] /∈ CN . [c]a =rejected if the conclusion node [¬c]
is in CN and it is preferred over [c]. In any other case, [c]a =undecided.
An inference node [r] is marked as [r]a =accepted if for every necessity rela-
tion (bi, r) in NR, the conclusion node [bi] is marked as [bi]
a =accepted. In the
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Fig. 3: An example of an inference graph
case that for at least one of the [bi] is [bi]
a =rejected, then [r]a =rejected.
Otherwise, [r]a =undecided.
Consider the inference graph of Figure 3. Conclusion nodes that has not
an accepted inference node as support, as it is the case of [m], [u] and [g],
are undecided. Unless there is a confrontation of complementary literals, a
supported conclusion node is also accepted. This is not the case of [a] and
[¬a] where, although both are supported, [¬a] is preferred over [a] (according to
some preference criteria), and thus [a]a =rejected and [¬a]a =accepted. As
[g−≺n, a] requires from [a], and [a]a =rejected, then [g−≺n, a]a =rejected.
All of this marking is made during the reasoning cycle of the actor in the
virtual environment, as explained in the following section.
3 The reasoning cycle
The goal of the framework is to provide a basis for the characterization of reason-
ing influenced by emotions in an agent or synthetic actor in a virtual scenario.
We are interested in a dynamic, continuous process of reasoning that provides a
believable illusion of human thinking. Thus, a reasoning cycle is modelled. Al-
though not shown in this paper, this cycle could be suspended or resumed when
needed in the virtual simulation. It is sufficient by now to present the model of
knowledge processing, which is sketched in Algorithm 1. An inference graph is
dynamically constructed by selecting a highlighted rule of the knowledge base.
Intensity of rules must be updated accordingly.
Algorithm 1 Reasoning Cycle
1: Obtain the expansion border, composed by all selectable rules and presumptions.
2: Select a rule or presumption r from the expansion border.
3: Expand the inference graph with r.
4: Create the inference node [r]
5: Connect [r] to each [bi], being bi a premise of r.
6: Connect [r] to [c], being c the conclusion of r.
7: Propagate acceptability and support states
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The expansion border is formed by highlighted rules for further reasoning.
These rules and presumptions are candidates to be integrated in the inference
graph in the current stage. In order to avoid erratic reasoning, there must be a
relation between candidate rules and the existing inference graph.
Definition 3. (Expansion Border) Given an inference graph G = (CN, IN, SR,
NR,AR) and a program P, the expansion border is a set EP,G that contains all
the rules or presumptions r ∈ P in the form h−≺b1, . . . , bn or h−≺ respectively,
such that r is highlighted, and either (a) r is a rule h−≺b1, . . . , bn and there exist
a conclusion node [h], [¬h] or [bi] in CN , or (b) r is a presumption.
The agent selects a rule or presumption from EP,G based on some preference
criteria4. The stimuli of the rules and presumptions can be used for that pur-
pose. Under such criteria, the agent selects the first rule found among the most
stimulated ones.
Once a new rule or presumption r ∈ P is selected for the expansion of the
inference graph, an inference node [r] is created. Then, the new inference node
needs to be integrated in the inference graph, so it is connected with the pre-
existent pieces of information.
An inference node [r] is connected by a necessity link to all of the conclusion
nodes [x] such that x is a premise of r. If there is no such a conclusion node
in the graph, it is created and marked as unsupported and undecided. After
making the connections, the marking of the inference rule will depend on the
marking of its premises. For example, if all the conclusion nodes containing the
premises for the rule exist previously and in accepted state, the inference node
will be updated to accepted. Instead, if at least one of these conclusion nodes
is rejected, the inference node will be rejected as well.
As the rule or presumption represents a new reason to believe in the conclu-
sion that is supporting, it is necessary to update the state of acceptability of the
supported conclusion node, and of further conclusions that it is indirectly sup-
porting. This update is done through a bottom-up propagation, starting from
the point in which the rule was included.
The inference node [r] is then connected by a support link to the conclusion
node [h], being h the head of r. If [h] is not in the graph, the system creates the
node which is, by default, unsupported and undecided. As [r] represents a
reason to believe in [h], if the former is accepted, then [h]s =supported. A
supported conclusion [h] will be accepted, unless there is in the graph an op-
posed conclusion node [¬h] that is preferred to it, in such a case [h]a =rejected.
Afterwards, changes should be propagated over the graph, in order to pre-
serve consistency. During the propagation, the process may reach two confronting
conclusion nodes (with complementary literals), and must to decide which one to
accept and which one to reject, according to some preference criteria. Then, the
markings are propagated over the ancestors of both nodes, in such a way that
dependant conclusions will always behave according to the state of acceptability
of the conclusions they are depending on.
4 DeLP uses specificity, but any other preference could be applied.
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For example, imagine that there is an inference node [r] such that all the
conclusion nodes which are premises to it are accepted, excepting for one of
them, [bn], so [r] can not be accepted. Suppose then that in a following cycle we
add to the graph an inference node supporting [bn] in such a way that it makes
[bn] to be accepted. In this new state, [r] has all their necessary conclusion
nodes accepted, so it also needs to be updated to accepted. Let h be the
head of r; then [h] has gained a support (the recently accepted [r]), and thus
[h]a (and [¬h]a, if [¬h] is in the graph) must be reviewed. If any change in [h]a
and [¬h]a, such a change must be propagated to every rule using these literals
as premises, and so on. We can observe that the propagation describe a tree
path, starting a new branch each time two complementary conclusion nodes are
found. The process ends when every branch of propagation reach a node with
no change in its acceptance state.
4 Making the framework dynamic
The framework provides an approach to an emotional-based control mechanism
for the inferences made by the agent. However, the emotional state of the agent
remains the same during the process. We are also interested in the dynamic of
emotions. We want the emotional state of an agent to evolve as consequence of
the reasoning process, in such a way that the intensity level of the rules in the
program is dynamic, and so the reasoning flows as the emotional state changes.
In order to model this, the following two steps must be added at the end of the
reasoning cycle: (1) Trigger the emotional effects due to the expansion by r, thus
changing values in ξ. (2) Update the intensity of the rules in P.
For the realization of the former, we define a function that triggers collat-
eral emotional effects due to the use of inference rules, in such a way that the
emotional state of the agent is modified dynamically through the process. This
modular construction of effects is interesting as provides it spots for behaviour
refinement in the simulation at the design stage.
Definition 4. (Inference Side Effect) Let r ∈ P be a rule, Gs the set of all
inference graphs, and ξs the set of all the emotional states. The inference side
effect s : P × Gs × ξs → ξs is the effect that the use of a rule of P in a given
inference graph, over a given emotional state, has over such an emotional state.
Concerning the second step, as the intensity level of the rules on the program
depends on the emotional state of the agent, and as the emotional state variates
due to the inference side effect, the intensity of the rules must be updated. This
can be done by a new computation of the intensity levels. As result, it may
happen that some rules in the program that were concealed, now become high-
lighted, and previously highlighted rules become concealed. Moreover, inference
rules that are already used in the inference graph may become concealed. In
this case, even though this will not cause the conclusion of the rule to lose its
support state in the graph, it can trim the expansion of the graph, making this
expansion point a non interesting one; i. e., when the expansion border is being
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obtained, the rules of the program containing the literals on the now concealed
rule are not taken into account.
5 Conclusion
In this work we presented an approach to emotional reasoning for believable
agents, by introducing a mechanism to progressively build a map of knowledge for
reasoning. We presented the notion of inference graph for progressive reasoning
in an emotional context. In this model, knowledge is partially highlighted and
noticed by the agent. Since emotions may affect reasoning and reasoning may
affect emotions, both elements evolve dependently over each cycle in the process.
Both the emotional state guide the agent to make adequate inferences, as the
inferences made by the agent trigger relevant changes over the emotional state.
This allows the modelling of believable reasoning behaviour, where emotions are
determinant in the recovery and use of knowledge in a given situation.
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